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THE DILEMMA OF PRESERVING OPEN SPACE
LAND-HOW TO MAKE CALIFORNIANS
AN OFFER THEY CAN'T REFUSE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Californians are presently facing a land use crisis.' Every
day thousands of acres are being irrevocably committed to some
form of development.2 At the same time, however, many
groups' are seeking to preserve open land in California for environmental, historical, recreational, or agricultural purposes.
The widespread effects of this conflict will be explored in light of
the limitations on land use controls imposed by the state constitution4 and will be analyzed in terms of past, present and future
legislative responses to this increasingly significant problem.
II.

CRITICISMS OF CURRENT LAND USE POLICY

A. Open Space: Where Has It Gone?
California has experienced unparalleled population and economic growth in the past 25 years,5 largely at the expense of its
best agricultural land." In 1958, California had approximately
12,249,000 acres of crop land.7 Between 1958 and 1967 over
one million acres of this land were converted to non-agricultural
uses.8 The United States Soil Conservation Service estimates
that unless some positive action is taken 808,871 additional acres
of California's open space land will be lost to recreational subdivisions9 by 1980 and 1.1 million acres will be lost to other types
1. ECKBo, DEAN, AUSTIN & WILLIAMS, OPEN SPACE: THE CHOICES BEFORE
CALIFORNIA 21 (1969).
2. SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, CALIFORNIA
SOIL & WATER NEEDS INVENTORY 18 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NEEDS INVENTORY].
3. A list of these organizations would include the Sierra Club, the California Cattleman's Association, and the Association of Bay Area Governments.
4. CAL. CONST. art. XXVIH and CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 37.
5.
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TASK FORCE REPORT ON LAND USE IN CALIFORNIA V-4 (R. Fellmeth, ed. 1971).
6. W. PORTELLO, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE,
CONSERVATION ACT OF 1965 HANDBOOK 13 (1967).

7. NEEDS INVENTORY, supra note 2, at 3, 18.
8. Id.

9. Id. at 17.
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of urban development. 10 This amounts to over 1.9 million acres,
nearly 529,000 of which will be prime agricultural land."
Although the use of open space for recreational facilities
and housing needs may be justified, the loss of such a large
amount of crop acreage will necessarily have a significant impact
on California's food production capabilities. So far, improved
agricultural production techniques have prevented serious food
shortages.' 2 However, improved techniques will not always be
sufficient to keep production and demand in equilibrium.' 3 Furthermore, the loss of this cropland acreage may seriously jeopardize California's position as the leading agricultural state, since
much of the land threatened with development is currently used
for the cultivation of "specialty crops," which can only be produced in areas where certain rare climactic and soil conditions
coincide. 4 While other areas may be found to produce these
crops, the result will be increased costs to the farmer, which will
be passed on to the consumer in the form of higher food prices.
As our population has grown, our cities have expanded to
meet the need for more urban housing, resulting in a process
known as urban sprawl. 5 It has been estimated that nearly all
the California cities which have experienced rapid population
growth could be condensed to one-half of their present area without seriously affecting their functions as population centers.'"
When scattered urban development, as opposed to contiguous urban development takes place, unused acreage within city perimeters becomes too valuable 7to be profitably used for farmland or
other open space purposes.'
It should be noted that agricultural land located in non-urban areas is also being subjected to development pressures."
This is largely caused by so-called "recreational subdivision" developers 19 who buy options to purchase land in non-urban areas
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. W.

PORTELLO, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE,
CONSERVATION ACT OF 1965 HANDBOOK 1-4 (1967).

CALIFORNIA LAND

13. Id.
14.

POWER & LAND IN CALIFORNIA, PRELIMIMNARY DRAFT, RALPH NADER TASK

FORCE REPORT ON LAND USE IN CALIFORNIA V-4

(R. Fellmeth, ed. 1971).

15. Id. at 11-12.
16.
-A

STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, SAN JOSE: SPRAWLING CITY
REPORT ON LAND USE POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA

6-7 (1971).
17. Id. at 7-9.
18. A. ZELVER,
FUTURE PLANNING

[hereinafter cited

THE IMPACT OF RURAL LAND DIVISION AND ITS EFFECT ON
AND DEVELOPMENT IN SANTA CLARA COUNTY

pt. V (1971)

as ZELVER].

19. Comment, Birth Control for Premature Subdivisions-A Legislative
Pill, 12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 523, 524 (1972).
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at a price in excess of the market value of the land if it were to be
used only for agricultural purposes. This activity drives up the
market value and the taxes of the neighboring parcels2" until the
landowners can no longer afford to retain the large tracts of land,
thereby forcing the division of the nearby land into smaller, less
economical parcels. 2 The potential repercussions of this action
can be tremendous. For example, since much of this type of
property is marginal grazing land,22 the cattlemen who own the
land can realize a profit only if the property is used in large
tracts. 23 Furthermore, because of the difficulty and cost of reassembling the tracts, division must generally be considered as an
irrevocable committment of land resources. 24 Additionally, the
division of the land into smaller units makes proper land management, soil conservation, and maintenance of watershed areas extremely difficult because of the problems encountered when dealing with a "proliferation of ownerships. 2 5 The local government, in turn, is burdened by the necessity of providing services
for the new "recreational community. ' 26 While some developers
provide these services initially, the problem of upkeep is eventually passed on to the local government, 2 negating the advantage
of second home developments: the added revenue they provide
by virtue of inflated land prices and higher property tax assessments.28
Advocates 29 of second home developments have argued that
much of the land used by recreational developers is of marginal
value as grazing land but highly profitable as vacation housing.
This view, however, overlooks the needs of the cattle industry in
California. The development of recreational subdivisions and
the subsequent increase of property taxes makes it increasingly
difficult for cattlemen to operate profitably."0 If this trend continues, it will probably result in the eventual demise of the Cal31
ifornia cattle industy.
20. ZELVER, supra note 18, at pt. VII.
21. Id.

22. Interview with John Passarello, Governor's Office of Planning and Research, State of California, Sacramento, July 17, 1972.
23. ZELVER, supra note 18, at pt. VII.
24. Id.
25. Id.

26. Comment, Birth Control for Premature Subdivisions-A Legislative
Pill, 12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 523, 525 (1972).
27. Id.
28. Z'ELVER, supra note 18, at pt. VII.
29. See C. Handley, Home Sweet Second Home, PSA FLIGHTIME, June,

1971, at 24. The author of this article was allegedly employed by Boise-Cascade,
the largest of the recreational subdividers in California.
30. Telephone Interview with Mr. W. Steiger, California Cattleman's Association, Sacramento, July 25, 1972.
31. Id.
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. It has also been argued that the location of recreational subdivisions in the foothills has prevented urbanization of the more
productive agricultural land in the valleys.1 2 This argument is
valid to some degree; however, the benefit of foothill development may very well be offset by the water pollution and soil
erosion caused by many of these developments,3" results which,
in the long run, have a disastrous effect on prime valley land.
It is clear that agricultural and other open space land is being lost at a rapid rate.3 4 Although many factors contribute to
urban sprawl and the proliferation of second home subdivisions,
the two most important causes of the loss of open space are the
property tax structure and the lack of adequate land use controls.
B.

CaliforniaProperty Tax Assessments

In California, for property tax purposes, land has tradition' '36
ally been assessed at a percentage 5 of its "fair market value.
However, when the population boom hit and the rush to develop
residential and industrial facilities began, the potential dangers of
this type of tax system to open space land became readily apparent.
As land in a particular area was purchased, the tax assessor used
the price paid for the property as a guide to the "fair market value" of all land similarly situated. 37 The purchase price of the
land was often several times the value of the property as farm
land, since the highest or best use of the "test lot" was often industrial or commercial, which raised the assessed value of the
nearby agricultural property to the commercial "test lot" level.
Property close to a "test lot" was therefore often taxed at a rate
far above the returns it could realize if it were used only for agriculture. 38 This taxation policy has made it extremely difficult
for farmers on the fringe of urban areas or near recreational subdivisions to profitably engage in agricultural operations because
they are forced to pay taxes on the potential, not actual use of
of their land.
32. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CONSERVATION, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF URBANIZATION ON THE FOOTHILL AND MOUNTAINOUS LANDS OF CALIFORNIA 6 (1971).
33. Id. at 19-46.

34.

NEEDS INVENTORY, supra note 2, at 3,18.
35. See, Sacramento v. Hickman, 66 Cal. 2d 841, 428 P.2d 593, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 609 (1967).
36. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 12, requires that the assessment be at the "full
cash value." For a discussion of the constitutionality of assessment at the
"fair market value" see Justice Traynor's opinion in De Luz Homes v. County
of San Diego, 45 Cal. 2d 546, 290 P.2d 544 (1955).

37. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE
FINAL REPORT 83 (1970).
38. Id.
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C.

InteractionBetween the Property Tax Structure
& Zoning Controls
Until recently, the basic tool of land use control has been
zoning. To a large degree, however, zoning has not been an effective means of controlling urban sprawl or preserving open
space land 9 because of the constitutional limitation on the exercise of the police power40 and dysfunctional institutional characteristics in the zoning system which cause many zoning ordinances to be permanent in form 4 ' but mutable in practice.
Local legislative bodies have traditionally been responsive to
public demands. In this responsiveness, however, is an inherent
danger that they will alter zoning ordinances if sufficient pressure
is applied by members of the community.4 2 This instability induces land developers to pay more money for property that is
zoned for agricultural or other open space use than the zoning
would seem to warrant, on the assumption that the zoning can always be changed to a higher use.4" The "speculative market
value" then becomes the "fair market value" of the property and
is used by the tax assessor when he determines the assessed value
of the property.
Contributing to the zoning and taxing problems are the institutional characteristics of zoning appeals boards, which tend to
inhibit the strict application of the laws by which variances and
special use permits are granted.4 4 Although California Government Code Section 6591111 makes it clear that zoning variances
39. Marion Clawson, Urban Sprawl and Speculation in Urban Land, LAND
ECONOMICS 38, 99-111 (1962).
40. While zoning controls (i.e., the police power) may only be exercised to
protect the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community, e.g.,
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926), and no land
owner may be totally deprived of the use of his land without just compensation,
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14, (but see Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of
Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962), appeal
dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962) ) in numerous cases, the California courts have
held that ". . . the line between taking and regulation is drawn in response to

two factors: (1) the extent of public need, and (2) the relative burden to the
landowner. Where the burden upon the landowner outweighs the public benefit,
the scope of the police power is accordingly narrowed.

Where acute public
CALIFORNIA
FINAL REPORT 112

necessity is present, a great deal of regulation is permitted."
LEGISLATURE
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LAND,

(1970).
41. See, e.g., STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAw SOCIETY, SAN JOSE: SPRAWLING Crry-A REPORT ON LAND USE POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN SAN JOSE,

CALIFORNIA 6-7 (1971).

42. Id. at 7-9.
43. See J. UKELES, URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, ThE CONSEQUENCES OF MUNICIPAL ZONING (1964).

44. Dukeminier and Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case
Study in Misrule, 50 KEN. L.J. 273 (1962).
45. CAL. GOVT CODE § 65911 (West Supp. 1972).
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are to be granted only in case of hardship, all too often the
Boards of Appeals consists not of planners but of businessmen
who consider it an economic hardship if anything less than the
maximum possible profit is extracted from a piece of property. 6
To a large degree, this philosophy explains why assessors have
been reluctant to recognize zoning when determining property
value.

III.

ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE DILEMMA:

A

STUDY

IN FRUSTRATION

A.

The Answer Is Simple-Or Is It?

There have been several attempts to deal with the problems
of preserving open space. The first came in 1957 when the legislature passed California Revenue and Taxation Code Section
402.5,1 7 which required the assessor to consider land use restrictions when evaluating the property for tax purposes. This section, unfortunately, was notably unsuccessful in reducing the
property tax, largely because the impermanence of zoning laws
was well known to land developers, who did not consider current
zoning laws as serious restrictions to their intended use of the
land. Accordingly, developers decided how much they would
pay for a particular parcel of land in terms of its potential rather
than its zoned use. The assessor, in turn, evaluated the land at a
percentage of this "full cash value," i.e., the "fair market value,"
as mandated by Article XI, Section 12 of the California Constitu48
tion.
In 1966, section 402.5 was repealed and replaced by section
402.1,11 which attempted to alleviate open space tax problems
by creating a rebuttable presumption to the effect that zoning restrictions are permanent in nature. Under the new section, the
assessor was required to assume that the buying public had taken
the land use restriction into account and that the "fair market
value" of the property had not risen on account of potential nonzoned uses. The impact of this modification is not yet clear, but
it seems likely that the public will continue to pay for land as if it
were unrestricted, since the new code section does not alter the
fact that land buyers still consider zoning laws impermanent restrictions. This problem, however, was squarely dealt with by
46. See Bryden, Zoning: Rigid, Flexible or Fluid? 44 J. UnAN LAw 287
(1967).

47. Cal. Stats., 1957, ch. 2049, § 1, at

-(West

1967).
48. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 37.
49. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 402.1 (West 1970).

Cal. Leg. Serv., repealed

SANTA CLARA LAWYER

[Vol. 13

Article XXVIII of the California Constitution," the" so-called
"Open Space Initiative," which passed in November, 1966. This
Article stated the case for open space and provided that land may

be restricted in its use and taxed in light of those restrictions.
Under the auspices of Article XXVIII, the California legislature passed sections 421 through 424 of the Revenue and Tax-

ation Code. 5

These sections require tax assessors to use the

capitalization of income method"2 when assessing the value of
any land restricted by open space easements,5 3 scenic restric-

tions,54 or the Land Conservation Act of 1965 (Williamson
Act).55 It should be noted that zoning is conspicuously absent
from the definition of restrictions, presumably because of the legislative recognition that zoning restrictions are simply too unstable to have any significant impact on the "fair market value" of
open space land. The importance of these sections, however, is
in the tax assessment advantages they give to land restricted under the Williamson Act.
B.

The California Land Conservation Act-A Misnomer?
1.

OperationalStructureof the Williamson Act

The Williamson Act was passed in 1965 as an attempt to
prevent the loss of agricultural and other open space land to ur50. CAL. CONST. art. XXVIII provides:
"Section 1. The people hereby declare that it is in the best interest of
the state to maintain, preserve, conserve and otherwise continue in existence
open space lands for the production of food fiber and to assure the use and enjoyment of natural resources and scenic beauty for the economic and social
well-being of the state and its citizens. The people further declare that assessment practices must be so designed as to permit the continued availability of
open space lands for these purposes, and it is the intent of this article to so
provide.
"Sec. 2. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Constitution, the
Legislature may by law define open space lands and provide that when such
lands are subject to enforceable restriction, as specified by the Legislature, to the
use thereof solely for recreation, for the enjoyment of scenic beauty, for the use
of natural resources, or for production of food or fiber, such lands shall be
valued for assessment purposes on such basis as the Legislature shall determine to be consistent with such restriction and use. All assessors shall assess
such open space lands on the basis only of such restriction and use, and in the
assessment thereof shall consider no factors other than those specified by the
Legislature under the authorization of this section."
51. CAL. REV. & TAx CODE §§ 421-424 (West Supp. 1972).
52. While the formula used to compute the tax is rather complex, the
basic intent is to tax property on a percentage of the income actually produced on the property rather than a percentage of the land's full cash value.
CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 423-423.5 (West Supp. 1972).
53. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51050 et seq. (West Supp. 1972).
54. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6950 et seq. (West 1966).
55. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51200 et seq. (West Supp. 1972).

1972]

OPEN SPACE LAND

ban sprawl. 6 Although the Act has undergone substantial revision since its passage,5 7 this basic purpose has remained unchanged.18 In its present form, the Williamson Act authorizes
cities and counties to enter contracts59 with individuals who own
property in areas the local government designates as "agricultural preserves." ' 0 The purpose of these contracts is to restrict
the use of the land to agricultural or other compatible open space
purposes for a minimum period of ten years.6 ' At the end of
each year, the restriction contract is automatically renewed without any further action on the part of either local government or
landowner. 6 2 Even if the landowner or the local government decides not to renew the contract, the land use restriction remains
in effect for the nine years remaining in the original contract.6 3
The landowner may, with the consent of the local government,
cancel the contract; 4 if he does so, however, he will be required
to pay a cancellation fee, which may be waived only with the con65
sent of the Secretary of the State Resources Agency.
2. Basic Criticismsof the Williamson Act
The acceptance of the Williamson Act by land owners and
local governments has been nothing short of phenomenal. There
are currently over twelve and one-half million acres of land under Williamson contracts.66 As remarkable and impressive as
this figure sounds, however, a glance at a map 7 indicates that
much of the land under contract was never in danger of development, while land on the rural-urban fringe, the focus of the Williamson Act, has not been protected. 8
56. Interview with Harry J. Krade, Assistant Director, California Depart-

ment of Agriculture, in Sacramento, June, 1972.

Mr. Krade was a member of

the advisory committee which drafted the original version of the Williamson
Act.
57. Mix, Restricted Use Assessment in California: Can it Fulfill its Objec-

tives?, 11 SANTA CLARA LAw. 259 (1971).
58. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 51220 (West Supp. 1972).
59.

CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51240 (West Supp. 1972).

60. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51241 (West Supp. 1972).
61. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51244 (West Supp. 1972).
62. Id.

63. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51246 (West Supp. 1972).
64. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51282 (West 1970).
65. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51283 (West Supp. 1972).
66. Memorandum from Jeff Reynolds, California Board of Equalization, to
Mrs. Barbara Sorenson, California Department of Finance, Sacramento, California, July 21, 1972.
67. GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF PLANNING & RESEARCH, STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
CURRENT LAND USE-WILLIAMSON ACT LANDS MAP (1971).
In addition see
address by Ronald B. Welch, California Board of Equalization, before the California Assembly Committee on Planningand Land Use, Nov. 19, 1971.
68. Address by Ronald B. Welch, California Board of Equalization, before
the California Assembly Committee on Planning and Land Use, Nov. 19, 1971.
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Williamson's Shortcomings
Many local governments have been unwilling to utilize the
Williamson Act as a means of protecting their open space land,
largely because restricted land can no longer be taxed as its "fair
market value," a result which substantially reduces the tax revenue derived from that property. "9 Furthermore, owners of
open space land near urban areas object to placing their property
in agricultural preserves, since this limits their ability to sell their
land to urban developers." The potential economic value of unrestricted land is too great a temptation for the landowner to resist; many landowners therefore choose not to contract away potentially valuable options.
Adding to this problem is the fact that owners of open space
land have often had to borrow money on their property in addition to paying high real estate taxes. In many instances, mortgagors have been unwilling to allow the owner of secured property to place a restriction on the land's use, r ' since restricted land
may not allow the mortgagor to recoup his losses should he be required to foreclose on the property. This view, of course, overlooks the fact that the landowner is much more likely to survive
economically with a Williamson Act contract because his taxes
would then reflect the actual rather than the potential use of the
land.
Land Protection Under Williamson-ImproperEmphasis
In addition to not preventing urban sprawl, the Williamson
Act has been criticized for protecting the wrong land, i.e., the
land least likely to be developed, while giving the owners of that
land substantial tax benefits. Supporters of the Act have countered this criticism by arguing that in rural areas not threatened
by development there is very little difference between taxes computed under Williamson and taxes computed at a percentage of
the "fair market value" of the property, because the "fair market
value" of the nonthreatened land should closely reflect the agricultural or open space value of the property.7 2 If the threat of
urbanization does not exist, the minimal decrease in county revenue" is outweighed by the potential benefits gained by assuring
69. Id.
70. Interview with Harry J. Krade, Assistant Director, California Dep't of
Agriculture, in Sacramento, California, June, 1972.
71. Id.
72. Address by Ronald B. Welch, California Board of Equalization, before
the California Assembly Committee on Planning and Land Use, Nov. 19, 1971.
73. id.
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that property will remain as open space for a relatively long period of time.74 Local governments, therefore, have everything to
gain and little to lose by applying the act to non-threatened rural
areas. It has also been argued that decreased tax costs for the
farmer will ultimately be reflected in lower food prices, benefiting the public with the advantages of open space land and lower
grocery bills.
As attractive as these arguments sound, they are flawed by
their assumption that the revenue decrease caused by open space
land under Williamson Act contracts can be offset in other areas
of the local tax base. The success of offsetting the tax loss necessarily depends upon the total revenue percentage contributed
by open space land. For example, in Marin County the revenue
from agricultural land amounts to only about four percent of the
county's total property tax revenue,75 while in Fresno County
over 45% of all property tax revenue7" is derived from taxes on
agricultural land. The hardship caused by placing a greater tax
burden on the other landowners in the latter situation clearly
demonstrates that the county supervisors must carefully evaluate
the advantages and disadvantages of protecting their agricultural
tax base.
Subvention Payments
The Williamson Act originally provided for compensation
in the form of subvention (subsidy) payments to local governments and to landowners who had placed their land under Williamson contracts. 77 This program, however, was rendered ineffective because local governments, unwilling to submit to the
strict state controls provided for in the legislation, largely failed
to utilize contracts as a means of implementing the Williamson
Act.78 This occurred despite the fact that large scale subvention
payments would, in effect, increase the tax base in rural counties
and would make urban residents, who also enjoy the benefits of
open space, pay their fair share.
During the First Extraordinary Session of 1971, the California Legislature passed several sections providing for subvention
payments. For the fiscal year 1972-73, the Legislature has ap74. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51244 (West Supp. 1972).
75. Interview with Bert W. Broemmel, Marin County Assessor, in San Rafael, California, June 25, 1972.
76. Telephone interview with staff member of Fresno County Assessor's
Office, July 20, 1972.
77. Cal. Stats. 1965, ch. 1443, § at -, (West Leg. Serv., repealed 1969).
78. Address by Ronald B. Welch, California Board of Equalization, before
the California Assembly Committee on Planning and Land Use, Nov. 19, 1971.
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propriated $13 million for subvention programs, $15 million for
the fiscal year 1973-74, and $17 million for fiscal year 197475.70

California Government Code Section 1610780 provides

that eligible local governments, (i.e., those with open space land
subject to an enforceable restriction) shall receive subvention
payments at the rate of $2 per acre if the land is prime agricultural land: 8 ' (i) within an incorporated city, (ii) within one
mile of the center of an incorporated city with less than 1500 reg-

istered voters, or (iii) within three miles of the boundaries of an
incorporated city with more than 1500 registered voters. For all
other prime land the subvention payment rate is $1.50 per acre,
and for non-prime land of "statewide significance" 82 subvention
payments of $.50 per acre shall be paid to the extent that money

is available. 83 Government Code Sections 1611384 and 1611411
provide that local school districts are to receive a General Fund

adjustment for land assessed under the provisions of Sections 423

or 423.5 of the Revenue and Taxation Code 81 if the school district tax rate exceeds a certain figure.8 7 This open space adjustment is to be calculated by determining the difference between
the value of land in the district in the year immediately preceding
the application of sections 423-423.5 and the value of land8 8
within the district for the current assessment year. Should sub79. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16118 (West Supp. 1972).
80. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16107 (West Supp. 1972).
81. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51201 (West Supp. 1972).
82. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 14, § 14112 (August 23, 1972) states that land is
of "statewide significance" if it is:
1. An area of outstanding scenic or recreational value.
2. An area required as a wildlife habitat.
3. Forests and agricultural lands adjudged to be required in order to
provide for the future needs of food, fiber and timber.
4. An area to provide open space in and around high density metropolitan areas.
5. An area needed to provide public access to coastal beaches, lake
shores and riverbanks.
6. An area requiring special development regulations because of hazards or special conditions.
7. An area providing a connecting link between major open space and
public recreational sites.
8. An area of major historic or cultural interest.
83. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16107 (West Supp. 1972).
84. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16113 (West Supp. 1972).
85. CAL. Gov'r CODE § 16114 (West Supp. 1972).
86. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 423-423.5 (West Supp. 1972).
87. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16113 (West Supp. 1972) provides that the local
school district shall receive a General Fund dispersement adjustment if the
school district tax rate exceeds:

".

.

. (a) two dollars ($2.00)

for each ele-

mentary district, (b) one dollar and ten cents ($1.10) for each high school
district, (c) three dollars and ten cents ($3.10) for each unified district maintaining grades Kindergarten though 12, three dollars and thirty-five cents
($3.35) for each unified district maintaining grades Kindergarten through 14,
(e)twenty-five cents ($0.25) for each community college district."
88. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16114 (West Supp. 1972).
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vention claims exceed the amounts appropriated the payments
are to reduced on a pro rata per acre basis; first to be cut will be
funds allocated to non-prime land, followed by funds to local
governments with restricted prime land, and school district dispersement allocations.8 9
Since there are over 12,500,000 acres subject to enforceable
restrictions, ° most of which are within the boundaries of at least
one school district, it is apparent that cities and counties with restricted prime and non-prime land will get considerably less money
from subvention payments than the statute seems to indicate,
because of the school district priority in the distribution of the
funds. While the subvention formula alleviates much of the
hardship borne by school districts when Williamson Act contracts
are entered into and the districts' revenue is reduced, it still does
not represent a positive incentive for the local government to enter a contract since by doing so its own tax base will be decreased.
A Tax Loophole for Industry?
In recent years, many large business enterprises have acquired large tracts of land near urban areas, subsequently placing their newly-acquired land under Williamson Act contracts.9 1
Although these lands are eventually to be used for plant expansion or other urban purposes, tax benefits are being reaped from
the Williamson Act before development. In fact, it has been argued that "big business" is violating the intent of the statute9 2
even though the public has also received benefits from the undeveloped property in the form of a reduction of urban sprawl.
In reality, though, the problem with this type of arrangement is
not that "big business" is getting a tax break, but that eventually
this land is destined to become part of the problem the Act was
designed to cure.
ParcelSize Requirements
Another difficulty with the Williamson Act is that it requires a minimum parcel size of 100 acres (except in unusual
89. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 16118 (West Supp. 1972).
90. Memorandum from Jeff Reynolds, California Board of Equalization, to
Mrs. Barbara Sorenson, California Department of Finance, Sacramento, California, July 21, 1972.
91. Address by Ronald B. Welch, California Board of Equalization, before
the California Assembly Committee on Planning and Land Use, Nov. 19,
1971.
92.
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circumstances) before an agricultural preserve can be established." The basic problem with this approach is that the small
acreage parcels are usually the least economical to farm, and are,
in fact, the very ones that need the tax break offered by the Williamson Act. The larger the acreage, the more likely it is that
the farmer will be able to hold out without a tax break.
There are other interesting aspects of the size requirement.
For example, some grain crops are economically feasible only if
grown on 200 acres or more, while other types of crops, such as
strawberries, may be economically grown on five acres or less. 4
In addition to the crop type, factors such as soil, water, and climate also assist in determining how large a tract is needed for a
particular crop. 5
Another factor involved in the minimum parcel size problem is the contribution of small amounts of acreage to "scattered
development."9 6 Small, privately held parcels of land in the
middle of partially developed areas serve to increase local government costs because of the difficulties of providing services to
areas developed in "checkerboard patterns. '97 On the other
hand, open space or undeveloped land in a partially developed
urban sector may contribute to the aesthetic qualities of the city.
The Impact of Williamson on the Foothilland Mountain Counties
The amount of protection the Williamson Act provides for
foothill and mountain lands is clearly inadequate because the potential revenue gain from recreational subdivisions is often too
great a temptation for the foothill and mountain counties to resist. Until now, many small counties have failed to recognize
that any increase in revenue will more than likely be offset by the
expenditures required to provide services to the newly developed
areas. Furthermore, the desire of the rancher or farmer to "keep
his options open" has often influenced him against placing his
land under the protection of the Williamson Act.
IV.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Zoning and tax structures have inadvertantly contributed
to the conversion of millions of acres of agricultural and other
93. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51230 (West Supp. 1972).
94. Interview with Harry J. Krade, Assistant Director, California Dep't.
of Agriculture, in Sacramento, California, June, 1972.
95. id.
96. See p. 3, supra.
97. STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, SAN JOSE: SPRAWLING CITY
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open space land to urban sprawl and recreational subdivisions.
As our population increases and our society becomes more affluent, the need for the conversion of open land to other uses will
continue. It is crucial, however, that this transformation be accomplished in accordance with a coherent, orderly plan which
balances the need for urban expansion and the development of
recreational facilities against agricultural and environmental requirements. Clearly Article XXVIII9 s and the Williamson Act99
were attempts to resolve this dilemma. Their failure to accomplish this goal, however, is equally clear. Other solutions are
needed as alternative means of preserving open space. These solutions are not exhaustive but are merely examples of the types of
feasible open space controls. It should also be noted that these
solutions are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
A.

Direct State Action

1. Since local governments are currently required to draw up
general plans containing open space elements' 0 with an agricultural use as a sub-element, and since the Governor's Office of
Planning and Research has been directed to survey all current
open space land in California,' perhaps one further step should
be taken. The State should be required to suggest or assign to
each county on a proportional basis the minimal amount of open
space land that it will be required to preserve. This would leave
to the local government the determination of which parcels of
land should be required to remain as open space.
In order to reduce local political oppostion, the legislation
should provide that the determination of the necessary amount of
open space land in a particular county include the views of local
officials. Maximum input should also be solicited, including
public hearings and surveys.
Once local governments have determined which land to preserve, it is unlikely that a change in the zoning will occur, since
land which is zoned for open space would have to be "traded" for
land already zoned for urban use if the local government is to
fulfill its open space requirement. In this case landowners in essentially equal positions would be competing with each other,
and it seems unlikely that the local legislature would act to
change the status quo. Furthermore, the added stability of this
scheme should help reduce the tax assessment on the open space
CAL. CONST. art. XXVIII.
99. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 51200 et seq. (West Supp. 1972).
100. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65560 et seq. (West Supp. 1972).
101. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65570 (West Supp. 1972).
98.
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land, since the "fair market value" of the land would more accurately reflect the use for which it was zoned.
2. Even though local taxpayers probably have standing to institute mandamus proceedings 0 2 against local officials to force
compliance with the code section requiring the inclusion of an
open space element in the local plan, ° I there are several obstacles to the effective utilization of the mandamus procedure. The
most significant of these is the evidentiary presumption that legislative bodies have acted properly.' 04 Since the statutes requiring an open space element do not clearly indicate what will satisfy
the requirement, a court is unlikely to issue a writ of mandate as
long as the local government makes what appears to be a good
faith effort to exercise its power and establish an open space element. One possible way of overcoming this problem is a statutory requirement that the Director of Planning and Research or
the Secretary of Resources determine whether any particular
open space element meets the requirements of the code. This
would, in effect, transfer the "validity of action" presumption
from the local government to the State. Thus, the only question
of fact left for the court would be whether the Director or Secretary abused his discretion in judging the sufficiency of open space
elements in a particular community. 0 "
3. Poor local planning staffs and the inability of local legislatures to properly evaluate the costs of land development are
problems that must be overcome if open space is to be preserved.
One way to alleviate the problems caused by shortsighted officials is to provide subvention funds to local governments in an
amount equal to the increase in revenue generated by the urbanization of open space land, less the cost of providing services to
the area if it were in fact developed. Even if the difference in
revenue were a negative amount, in which case the local government would not receive any subvention funds, this cost-benefit
This section provides that a
102. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1085 (West 1956).
writ of mandate may be issued to any ". . . corporation, board, or person to
compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins, as a duty
and CAL. CiV. CODE § 1086
resulting from an office, trust or station ...
the writ must be issued upon the verified peti(West 1956) states that "...
tion of the party beneficially interested." While the writ is generally only issued to compel the performance of a ministerial duty (Leftridge v. Sacramento, 81 Cal. App. 2d 450, 171 P.2d 659 (1943) ), the courts have carved a
major exception to this rule and will issue a writ of mandate to require local
officials to "exercise their discretion" (Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal. 2d 351,
196 P.2d 562 (1952) ).
103. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302 (West Supp. 1972).
104. CAL. EvID. CODE § 664 (West 1966).
105. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1955).
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approach would at least make local decision makers aware of the
real costs of urbanization.
4. Since the preservation of California's agricultural base is of
major concern, the State Department of Agrculture should be authorized and funded to undertake an intensive campaign designed
to provide guidance and advice to local governments in the process of developing the agricultural sub-element of their general
plans. The goal of this program would be the preservation of
the open space necessary to maintain California as an economically viable agricultural producer.
5. Finally, the state could purchase all open space land and
lease it back to the current owners or other potential users on a
long term basis. These lease agreements could incorporate land
use restrictions in the form of covenants that the land be used
only for agricultural or other open space purposes. It has been
estimated by various sources that this type of program could cost
over 4.1 billion dollars.' 0 The initial acquisitions might be
funded by the use of bonds, to be paid for by the lease returns.
Although any decrease in tax revenue could be partially offset
by the lease returns, it can be expected that a tax shift to other
county landowners would be required to recoup the loss to the tax
base. It is also likely that such a large-scale lease back arrangement would require a huge bureaucratic organization for administration, making this solution the most difficult and costly method
of direct state action.
It should be noted that each of the suggested methods of
direct state action will have only a limited effect on the preservation of open space land. For example, state allocation of the
amount of land each county shall be required to preserve as open
space does not necessarily mean that the local officials will preserve the land that is best suited for agricultural or recreational
use. Similarly, court costs and burden of proof problems may
preclude extensive use of the mandamus procedure. Furthermore, while subvention funding may provide the incentive for
local officials to preserve open space, this may cause overzealous
officials to zone land as open space even when such zoning will
totally deprive the property owner of any reasonable use of his
land. Finally, if the state were to make extensive use of the purchase-lease back method, the costs and administrative difficulties
would be prohibitive. Clearly then, direct state action will be ineffectual unless a coordinated approach combining these factors
can be developed.
106.
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Zoning Modifications

1. It has been previously indicated' 1 7 that the impermanence
of zoning regulations leads the buying public and the assessor to
believe that the market value of restricted property has not been
substantially reduced. Therefore, the factors in our zoning laws
which contribute to this problem should be modified by requiring
that once open space zoning is adopted, it must remain unchanged for a definite period of time. Flexibility in open space
zoning laws should be compromised for an assurance that open
space land will be preserved; annual automatic zoning renewal
can accomplish this result by maintaining open space land on a
"restricted" basis for no less than five years.
Another possible alternative to the present zoning system
would be to direct the assessor to conclusively presume that land
zoned for open space use will remain that way indefinitely. This
approach, however, raises several collateral problems; although
land zoned "open space" may be subject to the assessor's presumption that it will not be rezoned, developers may still be convinced that zoning changes will occur, causing market value to
rise in response to the developer's expectations. This will again
force the assessor to compute taxes based on this "expectation"
fair market value. Thus, even a conclusive presumption against
a zoning change will not significantly reduce the market value of
the land nor its taxes. Unless zoning is declared to be an "enforceable restriction" under Article XXVIII' °8 of the California
Constitution and the capitalization of income method 1 9 is used
to compute the tax, the landowner will still be forced to pay taxes
based upon the "fair market value" of the property as mandated
by Article XIII, section 37 of the California Constitution.1 10
In order to reduce the undesirable flexibility of the current
zoning process, a regional control board should be established to
insure that zoning in each community is compatible with the
needs of the entire region. A regional board would reduce flexibility by being removed from the immediate pressures of the local government processes without being so remote as to be insensitive to the needs of the local community.
The present system of granting zoning variances should also
be improved. In each local area, a referee who is an expert in
the field of land use controls should be appointed to hear all variance requests. His opinions should be published in a State re
107. See p. 7 supra.
108. CAL. CONST. art. XXVIII.
109. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 423-423.5.
110. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 37.
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porter system, similar to those in existence for civil and criminal

courts, to ensure that decisional uniformity and standardized criteria for granting zoning variances are maintained among the regional referees. Furthermore, a reporter system would provide
a more complete record for any subsequent judicial review, and
added zoning stability would be reflected in a "fair market value"
equal to the property's zoned use.
2. An additional alternative is the establishment of a zoning
system to preserve open space land and avoid the problem of a
public taking of land without just compensation. In this system,
land zoned as open space would be appraised at its market value
immediately prior to the effective date of the open space zoning.
After appraisal, compensation would be paid to the landowners
based on the difference between the land's prior market value
and its market value as open space. Land subject to compensable zoning should be taxed under the provisions of Article
XXVI, taking into account the relatively high rate of taxes paid
during the years when the land was not subject to a compensable
zoning restriction.
It should be noted, however, that if an attempt were made
to implement this system, it would have at least two potentially
counter-productive side effects: (1) The creation of a zoning
precedent that could cause all property owners to seek compenastion when their land is not zoned for its highest or best use
(which would hinder all community planning activities) and (2)
an immediate reduction in revenue received from property taxes.
This revenue reduction, however, should have short term significance. A lot, when restricted under the compensable zoning
procedure, is effectively taken out of the open market for land with
development potential, causing prices of remaining lots to be
driven upward. However, since there tends to be a lag in the land
market mechanism, an immediate decrease in local government
revenue may occur. On a long term basis, though, it seems likely
that the law of supply and demand will cause the value of other
property to rise and tax revenues to return to their original level.
C.

Williamson Act Modifications

1. A less drastic solution to the problem of preserving open
space land is a modification of the present Williamson Act. For
instance, the acreage limitation problem"' could be dealt with by
lowering the minimum parcel size requirement to five acres for
prime agricultural land, while retaining the 100 acre requirement
111. See text accompanying note 93, supra.
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for non-prime land. Any additional land the city considers necessary for aesthetic or other purposes should be included in an
agricultural preserve, provided the local government makes a
finding that it is necessary to retain the land as open space in order to protect the health, safety, or general welfare of the community.
2. One of the most significant features of the Williamson Act is
the fact that it is voluntary for both the local government and the
property owner. The problems this creates have been previously
discussed.11 2 However, it should be emphasized that local governments can place land in an agricultural preserve without placing it under contract. Landowners have not received significant
tax reductions from this approach, however, since the Revenue
and Taxation Code does not consider non-contract land to be enforceably restricted. To minimize the impact of this omission, the
assessor should be directed to presume that land in a preserve but
not under contract will remain in the preserve indefinitely. Although this presumption is not significantly different from the
presumption dealing with zoning, 3 the change in terminology may
cause both the potential purchaser and the county assessor to view
this type of restriction as being more stable than zoning. This, in
turn, will lower the property's market value and the landowner's
property tax bill.
3. The California legislature should pass legislation enabling local governments to impose enforceable restrictions on owners ot
open space land. This land, once restricted, should be assessed
under the provisions of Revenue and Taxation Code Sections
421-424. The unilateral imposition of restrictions by local governments must, of course, be done carefully because of constitutional prohibitions against taking private property without just
compensation. 114 Williamson Act restrictions, however, could be
given somewhat broader application than zoning restrictions since
the landowner will be compensated in the form of tax relief.
This mandatory procedure would be especially effective if used in
conjunction with larger subvention payments to local governments, providing them with both the incentive and the means to
preserve open space land. Finally, individual landowners should
be given the right to demand that their land be placed under
Williamson Act contract if it is economically viable agricultural
land, or is land having statewide significance.
112. See text accompanying note 69, supra.
113. See text accompanying note 38, supra.
114. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Before California can adequately protect its agricultural
base, prevent urban sprawl, and provide for the recreational
needs of an expanding population, its problems of property taxation and inadequate land use controls must be faced and overcome. Article XXVIII and its implementation through the Williamson Act were significant steps in this direction, although the
solutions provided by the Act have not been effectively utilized.
The choice of which method or combination of methods we use
to protect open land, or indeed, whether any attempt is made, will
undoubtedly be the subject of much controversy. It is clear,
however, that while the range of options which may be utilized to
preserve open space land is somewhat limited, the provisions of
Article XXVIII would be sufficient to accomplish this purpose,
either within the framework of a modified zoning system or a
revamped Williamson Act.
W. Gary Kurtz

